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ABSTRACT This study investigates the association between trade credits and imports of
developing countries. Made available by its creditors, the main function of trade credits is to
facilitate cross-border transactions of goods and services. This study finds that the reliance of
imports on trade credits varies across regions and income: towards the end of the 1990s, the
trade credits to imports ratio ranged from 0.20 for East Asia & the Pacific to 0.87 for Africa,
and from 0.24 for high-income countries to 0.79 for low-income countries. Applying panel
and cross-country estimation, we find that past trade credits help predict current imports,
but past imports do not alter the future path of trade credits. Further, the positive association
between trade credits and imports is larger for countries more dependent upon trade credits.
The findings support the notion that countries make debt repayments to avoid any potential
disruption on the line of trade credits. We also find that the trade credits penalty could
materialize within less than two quarters.
KEY WORDS: Debt repayment, international loans, trade finance
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Overview
Approximately half of world trade is conducted on credit, which can be defined
as when a supplier gives to its foreign buyer a trade-financing loan financed by
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318 Y. Jinjarak
commercial banks on both sides of the transaction.1 For importers, especially in
developing countries, trade financing from foreign suppliers is an essential source
of external finance. By the end of 2003, roughly a quarter of the developing coun-
tries’ total cross-border liabilities to foreign banks was based on trade credits.2
Most commonly, the reference to trade credits in international economics is in the
context of whether or not they can work as a trade penalty to enforce sovereign
debt repayments. As a result, recurring interests in trade credits are motivated
by the observation that turbulent periods in the financial sector (i.e. debt- and
financial crises) are often associated with difficulties in financing cross-border
commercial trade of debtor countries.
As trade liberalization has become a global phenomenon, the necessity of
trade credits has inevitably become a challenge to policy making. Following the
financial crises in the late 1990s, Krueger (2002) pointed to the benefits of a debt
restructuring mechanism that will facilitate a debtor country‘s trade-financing
need in order to limit the degree of economic dislocation. It is quite promising
then, that a better understanding of how trade credits function will also help
us to address the more important question of why a country should repay its
sovereign debt in the first place. In their seminal contribution, Bulow & Rogoff
(1989) succinctly put that a country has an incentive to make some repayments
on its debts in order to avoid its line of trade credits being discontinued and fully
gain from international trade:3
. . .Very short term trade credits, such as bankers’ acceptances and letters of credits, are
enormously important in reducing transactions costs in international trade. International
banks can exploit economies of scale in monitoring costs to facilitate transactions between
importers and exporters who sometimes know very little about one another. (Bulow &
Rogoff, 1989: 159)
Dictated by data limitation, the conceptual proposition of Bulow & Rogoff
has commanded only a handful of empirical tests. Rose (2005) reports that fol-
lowing the Paris Club sovereign debt rescheduling, bilateral trade between debtor
1There are two types of trade credits: (a) standard letter of credits (guaranteed payment to the
exporter promptly after its good has been shipped); (b) standby letter of credits (guaranteed pay-
ment to the exporter after the importer fails to honor its obligations in the contract). See also
USDOC (2002) and Palmer (1999). In a simple arrangement of international trade transactions,
after a supplier contracts to supply goods to a foreign buyer, there is a parallel trade financing loan
agreement in which a delegated bank lends on behalf of the supplier to the foreign buyer’s bank.
The loan is normally guaranteed by an export-credit agency of the supplier’s country (and/or a
lead bank, if the loan is syndicated).
2Calculated from the external debts statistics of the joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank network,
using the stock of trade credits as a percentage of consolidated total liabilities to banks (which
are nationals of (i.e. headquartered in) industrial countries and report their claims on a worldwide
consolidated basis, both short term and long term).
3Other considerations on repayment incentives include Eaton & Gersovitz (1981), Ozler (1993), and
Kletzer & Wright (2000). For analyses on contract enforcement in international trade, see Marin &
Schnitzer (2002), Greif (1993), Greif et al. (1994), and Dixit (2003). For studies on the importance
of commercial credits and finance in the context of comparative advantage in international trade,
see Eaton (1986), Kletzer & Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Klimenko (2002), Svaleryd & Vlachos
(2002, 2005).
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On the Causality between Trade Credits and Imports 319
countries and their creditors dropped by 8% a year and persisted for around 15
years. Rose argues that the subsequent decline in international trade is a result of
either creditors seeking to punish and deter default, or a result of trade credits
simply drying up upon default. Based on their gravity-type estimation, Rose &
Spiegel (2002) note that the high correlation found between cross-border trade
and lending4 corroborates the possibility that a debtor nation tends to borrow
more from a creditor country with whom they share more international trade ties.
It is plausible then, other things being equal, that an increase in bilateral trade
would increase the availability of trade credits a country receives from its trading
partners as a part of its trade and financial networks. Sarria-Allende et al. (forth-
coming) finds that although provision of trade credit increases immediately after
the crisis, it consequently collapses in the following months and years. Hence,
while it is possible that past levels of trade credits could help predict current lev-
els of imports, it is also conceivable that past imports would help predict current
levels of trade credits. That is, do trade credits Granger-cause imports, or imports
Granger-cause trade credits: in order to secure short-term loans to finance their
imports, are the borrowing countries financially constrained in international cap-
ital markets? If the causality runs from volume of imports to provision of trade
credits, the presence of trade credits would not aid the repayment incentive, and
the ability of a debtor country to fully gain from international trade would not
be affected by it in any case.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically evaluate the association between
trade credits and imports. Anticipating our main findings, we find that past trade
credits help predict current imports, but past imports do not alter the future
path of trade credits. Trade credits have a larger impact on countries that display
greater reliance on them. The next section provides preliminary discussion of the
data. The third section summarizes the panel and cross-country estimation. The
fourth section concludes.
Preliminary Discussion
The Appendix provides the data source and country list used in our sample.
Dictated by data availability, the sample covers 111 countries over the period
1991–2003. Figure 1(a) compares trade credits for periods 1991–93, 1994–96, and
2001–03 for the developing countries segregated into six regions. The record
is mixed: trade credits increased for East Asia & the Pacific and East Europe
& Central Asia, but declined for Latin America & the Caribbean and Middle
East & North Africa. Towards the early 2000s, East Asia & the Pacific registered
the highest amount of trade credits, totaling on average US$4.8 billion a year. The
region also registered the highest amount of imports from industrial countries (see
Figure 1(b)). Further insight about these developments is gained by comparing
trade credits/imports ratio. Although the salient feature of the last 20 years has
been the phenomenal increase in cross-border trade, as evident in Figure 1(c), a
comparison of trade credits/imports over the decade reveals that some regions
4An increase in bilateral trade of 1% is associated with an increase in bilateral lending (measured
by international banking claims) of over 0.5% (Rose & Spiegel, 2002).
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Figure 1. (a) Trade Credits (billion US$) by region. (b) Imports (billion US$) by region. (c) Trade
credits to imports ratio by region
rely more on trade credits than others. While Africa received trade credits on
average of US$0.8 billion a year, that amount is almost equal to the region’s total
import amount from industrial countries. On the other hand, trade credits feature
only a fifth of the total imports for East Asia & the Pacific region.
Figures 2(a)–(c) report trade credits, imports, and trade credits/imports ratio
segregated by income groups. As shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), the amount
of trade credits received and goods imported were positively associated with
the level of income. Further, while the trade credits/imports ratio decreased with
income, only the low-income group displayed greater dependence on trade credits
(see Figure 2(c)). From 1991 to 2003, the trade credits/imports ratio of the low-
income group increased by almost 100%, whereas the ratio dropped in other
income groups.
Overall, the preliminary evidence discussed thus far suggests that the asso-
ciation between imports and trade credits differs across income groups and
geographical regions. To gain further insights, we apply panel and cross-country
regressions in the next section.
Empirical Analysis
Panel Data Estimation
The objective is to discover any causal association between trade credits (hence-
forth denoted by x), and imports (denoted by y). Suppose there are N countries
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On the Causality between Trade Credits and Imports 321
Figure 2. (a) Trade credits (billion US$) by income group. (b) Imports (billion US$) by income group.
(c) Trade credits to imports ratio by income group
(cross-sectional observations) and T time periods of data available. Let i be the
index for countries and t the time periods. Allowing for a country effect (fi) for
country i, the model for estimation is:
yit = α0 +
m∑
l=1
αlyit−l +
m∑
l=1
δlxit−l + fi + uit (1)
where all variables are in logs. The dynamic panel data estimation of equation (1)
is characterized by autocorrelation due to the presence of lagged dependent vari-
ables (yit−l) among the explanatory variables and the country effects.5 To obtain
consistent coefficient estimates, we apply the dynamic panel data GMM esti-
mation of Arellano & Bond (1991) to equation (1) as the following. In the first
step, we examine the lag length (m) that is at least sufficient to characterize the
data. Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) we denote by M the relatively large
value of m used for initial estimation of the model. We re-estimate the model
with m = M − 1. If the increase in the sum of squared residuals is large, then
m = M is accepted. If the increase is ‘small,’ then we try m = M − 2, and with
successively smaller lag lengths until one is rejected by the data, or m = 0. In the
second step, we examine whether x causes y by testing the joint hypothesis that
δ1 = δ2 = · · · = δm = 0. Essentially, our causality test is a test of whether the lags
5See for example Baltagi (2001) for a comprehensive survey on econometric issues surrounding
dynamic panel data framework.
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of trade credits enter into the imports equation, and the test itself is conditional
on the chosen lag length.
To carry out the test, we use statistics on trade credits extended by industrial-
country creditors to developing countries. The amount of trade credits is recorded
twice a year (semi-annually) and includes all official and officially-supported trade
credits, summing together financial and buyer credits arranged by the industrial
countries’ commercial banks. These credits are normally guaranteed or insured by
official export credits agencies. Due to a major change in accounting procedures
and a discontinuity of the trade credits series in 1998, we are forced to employ
the data up to only that year. When we matched the trade credits series with
the volume of goods imported from the industrial countries, there was usable
information on 111 developing countries covering nine semi-annual periods from
1992 to 1997.
We begin by estimating equation (1) with three lags (m = 3) of each of
the right-hand side variables, so that we end up with five years of data
per country.6 We first test for parameter stationarity, i.e. both the country
effects (fi) and the lag parameters in equation (1) are the same for each
period. When equation (1) is estimated using m = 3, the minimized value of
the χ2 test statistic, which, following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), we denote
Q, is equal to 40.77, and has 34 degrees of freedom. Because the critical
value of the χ234 at 1% level is 56.06, we cannot reject parameter stationarity
and that the appropriate specification of the imports equation is a dynamic
panel data model containing at least three lags each of imports and trade
credits. To find a lag length that is at least sufficient to characterize the
data, we impose m = 2. The value of the Q statistic is 58.29. Comparing
this to the value of Q when m = 3, we find that the value of the appro-
priate (lag selection) test statistic,7 denoted L, is equal to 58.29 (restricted
Q) minus 40.77 (unrestricted Q), or 17.53, and has 2 degrees of freedom
(we are restricting the third lag of each variable). Because the critical value
of the χ22 distribution at the 1% level is 9.21, one can reject equation (1)
with two lags. The model with three lags for each variable adequately char-
acterizes the dynamic association between imports and trade credits in our
sample.
Table 1 reports the panel data estimates for the imports and trade cred-
its equations assuming parameter stationarity, but with no other constraints
6Four semiannual periods were lost in constructing lags and taking first differences. Note that
the econometric issues involving unbalanced panels are not relevant here because of T = 5 for all
countries in our sample. Given small T (length of time series) and large N (number of countries)
of the sample, potential bias caused by non-stationary panels is also not major. See for example
Phillips & Moon (2000) for a simulation analysis on unit roots and co-integration in panel data
where there are large N and large T. Further, Judson & Owen (1999) show that GMM estimation
on equation (1) performs well for the dynamic panel data model when T <10.
7Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) provides derivation of the test. They show how linear constraints in
the dynamic panel model can be tested in the conventional way by noting that the difference in
the constrained and unconstrained sum of squared residuals has a χ2 distribution with degrees
of freedom equal to the degrees of freedom of the unconstrained equation minus the degrees of
freedom of the constrained equation.
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Table 1. Baseline panel data estimation. Variables are in log. m denotes the first difference of lag m. The sample is a balance
panel data covering semiannual periods from 1992 to 1997. Estimation uses the dynamic panel data framework. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Symbol ∗ [∗∗, ∗∗∗] denotes statistical significance at the 10% [5%, 1%] level
Dependent variable: 1(Imports) 1(Trade Credits) 1(Imports) 1(Trade Credits)
Explanatory Variable:
1(Imports) −0.176 (0.073)∗ −0.004 (0.121) −0.146 (0.073)∗ −0.063 (0.112)
2(Imports) −0.183 (0.049)∗∗ −0.037 (0.128) −0.155 (0.049)∗∗ 0.018 (0.123)
3(Imports) −0.249 (0.045)∗∗ 0.233 (0.125) −0.232 (0.045)∗∗ 0.100 (0.091)
1(Trade Credits) 0.236 (0.063)∗∗ 0.133 (0.084) 0.240 (0.061)∗∗ 0.109 (0.073)
2(Trade Credits) 0.050 (0.063) 0.099 (0.055) 0.069 (0.063) 0.106 (0.049)∗
3(Trade Credits) 0.078 (0.067) −0.149 (0.043)∗∗ −0.035 (0.060) −0.145 (0.041)∗∗
Endogenous explanatory variable Trade Credits Imports n.a. n.a.
Observations 555 555 555 555
Number of Countries 111 111 111 111
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324 Y. Jinjarak
imposed. The Arellano & Bond (1991) procedure is used to both equations,
treating the right-hand side as endogenous and exogenous in the first and sec-
ond panel of Table 1, respectively. Denote m as lag m of the first difference,
we use lags of trade credits from dated (t − 4) and earlier as instruments for
1(Trade Credits), 2(Trade Credits), and 3(Trade Credits) in the imports
equation (and in a similar fashion to the trade credits equation). According to
the coefficient estimates in Table 1, trade credits affect imports, but imports
do not affect trade credits. 1(Trade Credits) is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in the import equations, suggesting that the short-run causality from
trade credits to imports was summarized by two quarters of data. On the
other hand, none of the imports variables is significant in the trade credits
equation.
Note that the signs and magnitudes of the coefficient estimates of the uncon-
strained estimation in Table 1 cannot be evaluated as correlations among
contemporaneous variables. The negative (and insignificant) coefficients of
lagged imports in the trade-credits equation appear counterintuitive given
the findings in Rose & Spiegel (2002) that higher bilateral trade is asso-
ciated with higher bilateral lending. However, the coefficient estimates in
Table 1 simply provide short-run lagged adjustment effects of imports on
trade credits and do no imply any particular sign for the contemporaneous
correlation between imports and trade credits; the contemporaneous corre-
lation would depend on other static considerations such as the gravity-type
variables (i.e. geography, currency, population, and political ties) documented
in Rose & Spiegel (2002). As any fixed effect is eliminated in the dynamic
panel data, it is useful to examine next whether the effect of trade credits on
imports continue to hold in the estimation segregated by regions and income
groups.
According to the coefficient estimates in Table 2, the impact of trade credits on
imports volume is significant only for Latin America & the Caribbean and the
Middle East & North Africa regions. Earlier, Figures 1(c) and 2(c) showed that the
trade credits to imports ratio has been declining, particularly for Latin America &
the Caribbean and Middle East & North Africa regions. These findings and the
regressions thus suggest that trade credits are declining in the regions where its
impact is greater. The effect of trade credits on imports is weaker for East Asia &
the Pacific, East Europe and Central Asia, and South Asia, where trade credits to
imports ratio display a relatively stable trend.
Table 3 reports the estimation segregated by income groups. The effects of trade
credits on imports are significant only for the Middle and Low-income countries.
Both groups also rely more on trade credits than the High- and Upper-income
groups. This again suggests that trade credits display a larger and significant
impact on the countries that depend more on it. Interestingly, however, we also
see in Figure 2(c) that the trade credits/import ratio trends downward for the
Middle-income countries, whereas it is rising sharply for the Low-income group.
Presumably, the Middle-income group has increasingly broadened its sources of
external finance away from trade credits as it moves up the income ladder and
improves its domestic financial system.
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Table 2. Panel estimation by region. Region classification by the World Bank: Africa (AFR), East Asia & Pacific (EAP), Eastern Europe &
Central Asia (ECA), Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), and South Asia (SAR). Variables are in
log. m denotes the first difference of lag m. The sample is a balance panel data covering semiannual periods from 1992 to 1997. Estimation
uses the dynamic panel data framework. Standard errors are in parentheses. Symbol ∗ [∗∗, ∗∗∗] denotes statistical significance at the 10%
[5%, 1%] level
Dependent variable: Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Region: AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR
Explanatory Variable:
1(Imports) −0.068 (0.098) −0.092 (0.106) −0.201 (0.246) 0.084 (0.107) −0.289 (0.147)∗ −0.294 (0.179)
2(Imports) −0.090 (0.077) −0.181 (0.088)∗ −0.147 (0.237) −0.297 (0.088)∗∗ 0.132 (0.120) −0.046 (0.183)
3(Imports) −0.335 (0.074)∗∗ −0.348 (0.086)∗∗ −0.633 (0.292)∗ −0.106 (0.107) 0.078 (0.109) 0.143 (0.184)
1(Trade Credits) 0.055 (0.070) 0.077 (0.065) −0.178 (0.333) 0.481 (0.169)∗∗ 0.240 (0.084)∗∗ 0.158 (0.196)
2(Trade Credits) 0.122 (0.075) −0.031 (0.060) −0.166 (0.248) −0.001 (0.201) −0.022 (0.086) −0.241 (0.258)
3(Trade Credits) 0.015 (0.074) 0.042 (0.057) −0.129 (0.348) −0.279 (0.170) −0.099 (0.083) 0.088 (0.175)
Observations 200 85 25 150 65 30
Number of Countries 40 17 5 30 13 6
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Table 3. Panel estimation by income group. Income classification by the World Bank. Variables are in
log. m denotes the first difference of lagm. The sample is a balance panel data covering semiannual
periods from 1992 to 1997. Estimation uses the dynamic panel data framework. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Symbol ∗ [∗∗, ∗∗∗] denotes statistical significance at the 10% [5%, 1%] level
Dependent variable: Imports Imports Imports Imports
Income: HIGH UPPER MIDDLE LOW
Explanatory Variable:
1(Imports) −0.246 (0.227) −0.191 (0.114) −0.201 (0.112) −0.254 (0.092)∗∗
2(Imports) −0.448 (0.347) −0.202 (0.095)∗ −0.376 (0.081)∗∗ −0.139 (0.068)∗
3(Imports) −0.429 (0.316) −0.238 (0.099)∗ −0.125 (0.075) −0.322 (0.063)∗∗
1(Trade Credits) −0.060 (0.195) 0.015 (0.113) 0.383 (0.100)∗∗ 0.153 (0.061)∗
2(Trade Credits) −0.202 (0.177) −0.121 (0.121) 0.013 (0.088) 0.065 (0.062)
3(Trade Credits) 0.194 (0.149) 0.191 (0.173) 0.018 (0.077) 0.078 (0.061)
Observations 25 140 175 215
Number of Countries 5 28 35 43
As discussed earlier, one possible reason countries repay their debts is to avoid
the discontinuation of their line of trade credits. Based on the coefficient estimates
presented so far, it is plausible that a trade penalty exists. Its impact on imports
could materialize within less than two quarters after sovereign debt default.
Cross-country Estimation
In this section, we conduct a robustness check using cross-country estimation.
While the panel data estimation in the previous section provides a useful short-run
pattern in the data, it lacks the control of other conditioning factors, of which
the data are available only at a lower frequency. Working with the cross-section
allows us to include other variables thought to influence imports and trade credits,
including GDP, GDP per capita, and total liabilities to banks, while at the same
time taking into account changes in global economic conditions over the sample
periods.
All of the variables are now measured as the change between the three sub-
periods: 1991–1993, 1994–1996, and 2001–2003 (henceforth denoted in front of
each variable by ). For the estimation purpose, we have, at an annual frequency,
the information for 120 countries on trade credits, imports, GDP, capita GDP, and
total liabilities to banks. Table 4 reports the cross-country regressions, including
also regional dummies. Overall, our estimation accounts for 55–62% of variation
in the data. The coefficient estimates are consistent with those from the panel
estimation. We find that the change of trade credits is positively associated with
the change of imports. The outcome continues to hold whether we use the change
between 1991–1993 and 1994–1996, or the decadal change between 1991–1993
and 2001–2003.
Next, we replace the dependent variable with the imports to GDP ratio, and the
explanatory variable with trade credits to total liabilities to banks. The coefficient
estimates are not significant. Presumably, this weak and negative finding is due
to the scope of the sample and that we are able to consider only the interaction
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Table 4. Cross-country estimation Variables are measured as a percentage change between periods. Estimation uses the OLS. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Symbol ∗ [∗∗, ∗∗∗] denotes statistical significance at the 10% [5%, 1%] level
Dependent variable: Imports Imports Imports/GDP Imports/GDP
Period: (1991-93 to 1994-96) (1991-93 to 2001-03) (1991-93 to 1994-96) (1991-93 to 2001-03)
Explanatory Variable:
(Trade Credits) 0.115 (0.033)∗∗∗ 0.048 (0.022)∗∗
(capita GDP) 0.924 (0.390)∗∗ 0.622 (0.075)∗∗∗
(Trade Credits/
Total Liabilities to Banks) −0.002 (0.026) −0.010 (0.043)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.588 0.620 0.600 0.555
Number of Countries 120 120 120 120
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between developing-country debtors and their industrial counterparts. In addi-
tion, it is quite possible that the positive effect of trade credits is mitigated by
the negative impact as it is also a burden in a country’s total liabilities to foreign
banks. It is not simple to fix this measurement error to be able to go deeper into
the details. The availability of consistent panel and cross-section information at
both high (monthly) and low (annual) frequency will therefore allow a useful
extension.
Figure 3 summarizes the cross-country study, reporting the economic sig-
nificance of trade credits and capita GDP on imports volume. We calculate
the economic significance based on the coefficient estimates in Table 4 as the
following. The first bar represents the impact of trade credits, measuring a per-
centage change of imports/GDP based on the mean in 1994–1996 of trade credits
(US$7.059 billion) and GDP (US$127.850 billion). The standard deviation of the
percentage change of trade credits for the period 1994–1996 is 132.647. Using the
coefficient estimate of trade credits on imports from Table 4 panel 1, which is 0.115
and statistically significant, the effect of +1 standard deviation change of trade
credits is to increase imports by [0.115 × 132.647] × (7.059/127.850) ≈ 0.84%
of GDP. The economic significance of trade credits on imports is stable and siz-
able at around 1% of GDP between 1991–1993 and 1994–1996, as well as for
the decadal change between 1991–1993 and 2001–2003. The capita GDP variable
also explains much of the variation in the imports adjustment over the periods.
Over the decade, the change in capita GDP will increase imports/GDP more than
3%. Empirically, capita GDP tends to correlate with a host of macroeconomic
and institutional conditions, including, for example, GDP growth, real exchange
rate adjustment, openness, and political regimes. To single out the impact of these
variables, a possible extension can focus on a country case (or group of countries),
using a higher frequency (i.e. monthly) data.
Summary
One possible reason countries repay their debts is to avoid any disruption to com-
mercial trade. Functioning mainly as a cross-border financial instrument, trade
credits are often thought to increase the probability of sovereign debt repayment.
The main findings of this paper are that (1) past trade credits help predict cur-
rent imports, but past imports do not cause the future path of trade credits; (2)
two quarters are sufficient to summarize the relevant intertemporal association
between trade credits and imports. These findings confirm the dependence of
developing countries on the provision of trade credits from their trading part-
ners. That trade credits aid the incentive to repay is therefore supported by the
data.
In practice, most trade credits are short-run liabilities between delegated com-
mercial banks of importers and exporters. Our findings are sensible as the
estimated time that potential trade penalties via reduction in trade credits could
materialize is within less than two quarters. Any trade penalty is likely to be most
effective when the debtor’s gains from international trade are large, and the cred-
itor country’s small, but the costliness of possible trade sanctions to the creditor
need not render them ineffective, and trade sanctions can be effective even if they
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Figure 3. Measuring economic significance – the effect (%) on imports of a one standard deviation
change in trade credits. The calculation is based on the coefficient estimates in Table 4 as follows.
The first bar represents the impact of trade credits, measuring a percentage change of imports/GDP
based on the mean in 1994–1996 of trade credits (7.059 billion US$) and GDP (127.850 billion
US$). The standard deviation of the percentage change of trade credits for the period 1994–1996 is
132.647. Using the coefficient estimate of trade credits on imports from Table 4 panel 1, which is
0.115 and statistically significant, the effect of +1s.d. change of trade credits is to increase imports
by [0.115 × 132.647] × (7.059/127.850) ≈ 0.84% of GDP
are not actually used (Eaton & Engers, 1992). Hence, one may view our findings
here as supportive of the notion that commercial trade and financial networks
are intertwined.
Delving deeper into the details, exactly then how does a disruption in a coun-
try’s financial system affect trade credits as a source of external finance? For
example, should a country with stronger trade and financial ties with its trad-
ing partners (or creditors) be less affected by disruptions in the financial system
because it might be better in securing trade-financing loans? The linkages between
trade credits and imports could also depend on networks in international trade
and bargaining power between trading partners.8 Exploration on trade finance
deals data will also allow a useful extension and uncover other aspects of credit
provision across countries. These challenges are left for future investigation.
8On trade and financial networks in international arena, see for example Rauch (1999), Forbes &
Chinn (2004), and Portes & Rey (2005). On financial crises and international, see Cline (1987),
Stephens (1998), and Ma & Cheng (2003). Current data limitation does not allow a direct test on
the association between bilateral (or between other grouping of countries, i.e. G7 and emerging
markets) trade volume and bilateral trade financing amount. In particular, the Joint External Debt
Hub (JEDH) data by BIS, IMF, OECD, and World Bank does not provide trade credit data by
creditor. The JEDH adds together the data from both creditor and borrower and reports the
total trade credit amount by the borrowing country because the creditor countries provide only
official and official guaranteed trade credits – even if it was provided, the creditors’ trade credit
data underestimates borrower data as they only cover official and officially guaranteed non-bank
trade credits (please also see http://www.bis.org/publ/bispap13.pdf). Nevertheless, without testing
directly on the bilateral relationship, which is not permitted by the data availability, we expect
the main findings to continue to hold. Our reading from trade financing magazines (i.e. Trade &
Forfaiting Review; http://www.tfreview.com/) suggests that in practice the lending banks follow
standard monthly trade financing rates. These rates will guide the pricing of trade loans for both
small, financial-center, and large trade lending banks, including those in industrial countries, such
as Barclays, Citigroup, Sumitomo Mitsui, and HSBC.
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Appendix A.1. Data Source and Definition
WDI ≡ World Development Indicators Online by the World Bank
DOTS ≡ Direction of Trade Statistics by International Monetary Fund
JEDH ≡ Joint External Debt Hub by BIS, IMF, OECD, and World Bank
Variable Frequency Source Description
GDP annual WDI line
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD
Constant year 2000
US$ Gross Domestic
Product
Capita GDP annual WDI line
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD
Constant year 2000 US$
GDP per capita
U.S. GDP
deflator
annual WDI line
NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS
Deflator with base year
2000
Imports quarterly DOTS line 10170..DZD Current US$ Imports
volume deflated by
U.S. GDP deflator
Trade credits quarterly JEDH line L Current US$ trade
credits deflated by
U.S. GDP deflator
Total
liabilities
to banks
quarterly JEDH line J Current US$ total
liabilities to banks
deflated by U.S. GDP
deflator
Appendix A.2. Country List
Region and income classification by the World Bank. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ codifies upper,
middle, low-income, respectively. Africa(AFR), East Asia & Pacific(EAP), Eastern
Europe & Central Asia(ECA), Latin America & the Cribbean (LAC), Middle East
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and North Africa (MNA), and South Asia (SAR).
Region Country Region Country
AFR Angola∗∗ Hong Kong, China∗∗∗∗
Benin∗ Indonesia∗∗
Botswana∗∗∗ Korea∗∗∗
Burkina Faso∗ Laos∗
Burundi∗ Macao∗∗∗∗
Cameroon∗ Malaysia∗∗∗
Cape Verde∗∗ Mongolia∗
Central African Rep.∗ Papua New Guinea∗
Chad∗ Philippines∗∗
Comoros∗ Samoa∗∗
Congo, Rp.∗ Singapore∗∗∗∗
Equatorial Guinea∗∗∗ Thailand∗∗
Ethiopia∗ Vanuatu∗∗
Gabon∗∗∗ Viet nam∗
Gambia∗ ECA Albania∗∗
Ghana∗ Belarus∗∗
Guinea∗ Bulgaria∗∗
Guinea-Bissau∗ Croatia∗∗∗
Kenya∗ Czech Republic∗∗∗
Lesotho∗ Estonia∗∗∗
Madagascar∗ Georgia∗∗
Malawi∗ Hungary∗∗∗
Mali∗ Kazakhstan∗∗
Mauritania∗ Latvia∗∗∗
Mauritius∗∗∗ Lithuania∗∗∗
Mozambique∗ Macedonia∗∗
Namibia∗∗ Poland∗∗∗
Niger∗ Russia∗∗∗
Nigeria∗ Slovak Republic∗∗∗
Rwanda∗ Turkey∗∗∗
Senegal∗ Ukraine∗∗
Seychelles∗∗∗ Uzbekistan∗
Sierra Leone∗ LAC Argentina∗∗∗
South Africa∗∗∗ Barbados∗∗∗
Sudan∗ Belize∗∗∗
Swaziland∗∗ Bolivia∗∗
Tanzania∗ Brazil∗∗
Togo∗ Chile∗∗∗
Uganda∗ Colombia∗∗
Zambia∗ Costa Rica∗∗∗
Zimbabwe∗ Dominica∗∗∗
EAP Cambodia∗ Dominican Republic∗∗
China∗∗ Ecuador∗∗
Fiji∗∗ El Salvador∗∗
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Region Country Region Country
Grenada∗∗∗ MNA Algeria∗∗
Guatemala∗∗ Egypt∗∗
Guyana∗∗ Iran∗∗
Haiti∗ Israel∗∗∗∗
Honduras∗∗ Jordan∗∗
Jamaica∗∗ Lebanon∗∗∗
Mexico∗∗∗ Morocco∗∗
Nicaragua∗ Oman∗∗∗
Panama∗∗∗ Syria∗∗
Paraguay∗∗ Tunisia∗∗
Peru∗∗ Yemen∗
St. Lucia∗∗∗ SAR Bangladesh∗
St. Vncent & Grenadines∗∗∗ India∗
Trinidad & Tobago∗∗∗ Nepal∗
Uruguay∗∗∗ Pakistan∗
Venezuela∗∗∗ Sri Lanka∗∗
